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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this report is to present the results of a site-wide system 
fragility assessment. This assessment focuses solely on the performance of 
the water distribution systems that supply Chemical and Metallurgy 
Research (CMR), Weapons Engineering and Tritium Facility (WETF), 
Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF), Waste 
Characterization, Reduction, Repackaging Facility (WCRRF), and 
Transuranic Waste Inspectable Storage Project (TWISP). The analysis 
methodology is based on the American Lifelines Alliance1 seismic 
fragility formulations for water systems. System fragilities are convolved 
with the 1995 LANL seismic hazards to develop failure frequencies. 
Acceptance is determined by comparing the failure frequencies to the 
DOE-1020 Performance Goals.  
 
This study concludes that  
•  If a significant number of existing isolation valves in the water 
distribution system are closed to dedicate the entire water system2 to 
fighting fires in specific nuclear facilities; 
•  Then, the water distribution systems for WETF, RLWTF, WCRRF, and 
TWISP meet the PC-2 performance goal and the water distribution 
system for CMR is capable of surviving a 0.06g earthquake. 
 
A parametric study of the WETF water distribution system demonstrates 
that 
•  If a significant number of valves in the water distribution system are 
NOT closed to dedicate the entire water system to fighting fires in 
WETF; 
                                                 
1 The American Lifelines Alliance is a partnership between the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), the National Institute of Building Sciences, the Federal Highway Administration (FHwA), Pacific 
Gas & Electric Company, ROHN Industries, Inc., the US Geological Survey, and the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation.  The American Society of Civil Engineers was also a partner when the seismic fragility 
formulations for water systems were developed.  
 
2 The effect of dedicating the entire water supply system to CMR, WETF, RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP 
at the expense of other buildings is not evaluated in this assessment. 
1 
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•  Then, the water distribution system for WETF has an annual probability 
of failure on the order of 4 × 10-3 that does not meet the PC-2 
performance goal. 
Similar conclusions are expected for CMR, RLWTF, WCRRF, and 
TWISP. 
 
It is important to note that some of the assumptions made in deriving the 
results should be verified by personnel in the safety-basis office and may 
need to be incorporated in technical surveillance requirements in the 
existing authorization basis documentation if credit for availability of fire 
protection water is taken at the PC-2 level earthquake levels.  Assumptions 
are presented in Section 2.2 of this report.  
 
 
 
1.  Introduction, Purpose, and Scope 
1.1  Introduction and Purpose 
Five Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) nuclear facilities rely on site-supplied 
water for post-Natural Phenomena Hazards (NPH) event fire suppression [1]. These 
facilities were identified in a Gap Review of DOE-G-420.1-2 that was performed by the 
Safety Basis Office [2]. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess whether site-supplied 
water will be available to these facilities following a seismic event.  
 
In 1998, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Society 
of Civil Engineers entered into a cooperative agreement to establish the American 
Lifelines Alliance (ALA) to facilitate the "creation, adoption and implementation of 
design and retrofit guidelines and other national consensus documents that, when 
implemented by lifeline owners and operators, will systematically improve the 
performance of utility and transportation systems to acceptable levels in natural hazard 
events, including earthquakes." [3] In 2001, the ALA issued Seismic Fragility 
Formulations for Water Systems [4]⎯which forms the technical basis for this 
assessment.  
1.2 Scope of This Assessment 
This memorandum contains an assessment of whether site-supplied water will be 
available to five selected facilities following a seismic event. The following five 
facilities, identified in the GAP analysis, are included in the scope of this assessment. 
 Chemical and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building located at TA-3,  
 Weapons Engineering and Tritium Facility (WETF) at TA-16,   
 Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF) at TA-50,  
 Waste Characterization, Reduction, Repackaging Facility (WCRRF) at TA-50, 
and 
 Transuranic Waste Inspectable Storage Project (TWISP) at TA-54. 
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The gap analysis identified a sixth facility, Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility 
(TSFF), which was removed from the scope because of a pending mission change. 
 
The site-supplied portion of the fire-suppression system consists of water storage tanks, 
distribution piping, hydrants, valves and the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) system. These components are evaluated probabilistically using the American 
Lifelines Alliance Seismic Fragility Formulations for Water Systems [4]. System 
fragilities are convolved with LANL seismic hazards to develop failure frequencies. 
Acceptances are determined by comparing the failure frequencies to the DOE-1020 
Performance Goals [5].  
2 Input and Assumptions 
2.1 Input 
This assessment is based on the following input: 
 
(1) The facilities required to be evaluated and their respective seismic acceptance 
criteria are identified in Reference 1 and summarized in Table 1. 
 (2) Pipe length, diameter, and materials are extracted from AutoCAD drawings of the 
water distribution provided by Utilities personnel. Water storage tank information 
has been deduced through the use of schematic drawings provided by KSL, 
interviews with Utilities personnel, and physical observations. Information 
concerning site-wide system operations can be found in Reference 6.   
(3) Seismic hazard data are from References 7, 8, and 9.  
 
Table 1.  Target Water Distribution Acceptance Criteria 
Facility Acceptance Criteria 
CMR 0.06-g Design-Basis Earthquake (DBE)
WETF PC-2 
RLWTF PC-2 
WCRRF PC-2 
TWISP PC-2 
 
2.2 Assumptions 
This assessment is based on the following assumptions: 
 
(1) In the event of emergency, the water distribution system is assumed to be 
dedicated to fighting fires at the following nuclear facilities: CMR, WETF, 
RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP. 
(2) After the seismic event, emergency personnel will close existing isolation valves 
on leaking branch lines to dedicate the water supply system to CMR, WETF, 
RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP. Isolation valves on nonleaking branch lines need 
not be closed. 
(3) Emergency personnel will close the required isolation valves fast enough to retain 
sufficient inventory for the facility’s fire-suppression needs. 
3 
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(4) Upstream leaks are assumed to be isolated from the first storage tank. 
(5) The contents of the first storage tank upstream from the nuclear facility meet all 
of that facility’s fire-suppression needs. 
(6) The existing (1995) seismic hazard curves are assumed to accurately represent the 
site’s seismic hazard. An assessment of the potential impact from an updated 
seismic hazard study is contained in Section 6.5. 
 
Assumptions 1 through 4 minimize the total length of the water distribution system that 
can leak and minimize the probability of piping failure. Thus, the probability of pipe 
failure on the far side of available existing isolation valves is omitted from this 
assessment. Assumption 5 minimizes the probability of tank failure. 
3. System Description 
3.1 General 
LANL’s site-wide water distribution system supplies both the domestic and fire-
protection requirements into the same system. The system uses approximately 360 
million gallons of water a year, which is supplied by Los Alamos County from wells. 
There are 19 water storage tanks that provide LANL its water. Distribution of the water is 
achieved through approximately 100 miles of underground piping.   
 
The LANL water distribution system is gravity fed and can operate without power. Most 
of the tanks serve as intermediate storage points within the entire system. Some of the 
tanks are also directly connected to well pump stations. Located at these tanks are booster 
stations that provide the required pressure to move water from the wells to the tanks.   
 
There are two basic design types of water storage tanks at LANL. The air-gap protection 
tank uses two separate pipes to fill and discharge the contents of the tank. The fill pipe 
connects to the top of the tank, but the discharge line is located at the bottom. Below the 
fill pipe is a full-tank sensor. Should the sensor fail, an overflow pipe is also provided to 
maintain the air gap. The air gap provides backflow prevention. An air-gap protection 
tank is shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Air gap protection-type tank, (note the fill and overflow piping on the right). 
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The other type of tank uses a single pipe, located near the base of the tank, to both fill and 
discharge the contents. With the single pipe tank design, flow is regulated so that if both 
the tank and a facility are dependant on that tank and need water, the facility demand 
takes precedence.  
 
Storage tanks also differ in design by the way they are anchored to the ground. One of the 
tanks evaluated in this assessment has an anchoring system that restrains the tank from 
displacement during ground movement. The rest, however, are welded to a metal base 
plate that rests, unanchored, on top of the concrete foundation pad. These differences are 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Most of the tanks in the site-wide system and all the tanks concerned with in this assessment 
have rigid-type pipe-to-tank connections. These connections provide little to no 
flexibility and greatly increase the probability of pipe-to-tank connection failure. There 
are two typical configurations, the straight pipe configuration exits directly downward 
through the foundation pad, but the other configuration has the exit located in the 
sidewall of the tank near the ground. A large pipe, with an angled elbow, connects to this 
exit and drops directly into the ground as shown in Figure 3. The pipe connection to the 
water tank is hereafter referred to as a nozzle to avoid confusion with the water 
distribution piping. 
 
The water level in all tanks is controlled through altitude valves. These valves, along with 
pressure sensors are monitored using SCADA software. The tanks have cathodic 
protection systems to mitigate corrosion and wear. In addition, a yearly examination is 
performed in order to assess the exterior condition of the tanks and their appurtenances.   
 
 
 
 
Anchored Tank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unanchored Tank 
Figure 2.  Anchored and unanchored tank base details, 
(note anchor bolts, bolt chairs, and stiffeners). 
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Figure 3.  External rigid piping connection (nozzle). 
 
The piping that makes up the actual distribution part of the system considered in this 
assessment consists of cast iron, concrete cylinder (CCP), copper, ductile iron, galvanized 
steel, polyvinyl chloride (PVC), steel, and asbestos cement. Cast-iron piping is the 
dominant material type. Piping diameters range from less than one inch on service lines 
to approximately 16 inches on main lines, with the majority of distribution pipes having 
diameters of 8 inches to 12 inches. Approximately 14 miles of piping are included in this 
assessment. 
 
The piping system has a number of different types of valves. These include isolation 
valves, backflow prevention valves, and pressure-reducing valves. 
 
Isolation valves are the only valves explicitly considered in this assessment. Most LANL 
isolation valves are usually left open; however, some are closed to keep water from areas 
that might freeze. Isolation valves are typically located in valve box housings situated in 
the ground. These housings have a cap that has been tack-welded on top to prevent 
tampering. The valves can be closed manually by means of a “T” bar.    
3.2 Facility Descriptions 
Although the five facilities concerned with in this assessment are all part of the lab-wide 
water-distribution system, it is possible to isolate three facilities with their own storage 
tank and pipe system. These water-distribution systems are considered independent of 
each other with completely separate configurations. The remaining two facilities, 
RLWTF and WCRRF, use a common water distribution system.  
 
The piping lengths reported in the facility descriptions correspond to the minimum 
lengths required for dedicated supply to CMR, WETF, RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP. 
These lengths are based on existing piping layouts and valve locations. 
3.2.1 CMR Water-Distribution System 
The Chemical and Metallurgy Research facility, CMR (TA-3-29), first began operations 
in 1952 and since then has been actively working with the chemistry and metallurgy of 
6 
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uranium and plutonium. The building is one of the largest at the lab, with an area of 
550,000 square feet distributed among seven interconnected wings.   
 
The CMR’s water supply is provided by the storage tank located at TA-62-1, shown in 
Figure 4. This tank holds potable water not dedicated solely for the use of fire protection.  
The tank supplies domestic water to over 120 separate buildings within TA-3 and other 
buildings found elsewhere. The tank is unanchored and made of welded steel.  The tank 
connects to its pipe system using the nozzle connection described previously.  
 
CMR is also supplied by water tank, TA-69-7, which has a capacity of 4 Million Gallons. 
Due to its larger size, Tank TA-69-7 has a larger probability of failure (discussed in 
Section 4.1.2) than tank TA-62-1. Thus, water supplied from tank TA-69-7 is 
conservatively omitted from the current assessment. 
 
Water-distribution piping supplying CMR is made of cast iron, ductile iron, galvanized 
steel, PVC, and copper as shown in Table 2.  Up to 48 isolation valves may need to be 
closed to dedicate the water distribution system to CMR and remove leaking branch lines. 
 
Capacity: 1.5 million gallons 
Height: 35 ft 
Width: 85 ft 
Height-to-width ratio: 0.41 
 
Figure 4.  Water tank TA-62-1. 
 
Table 2.  CMR Distribution System Piping 
Material Diameter (in.) Length (ft)
Cast Iron <12 14,627 
Galvanized Steel <12 788 
PVC <12 423 
Copper <12 170 
 16,008  
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3.2.2 WETF Water-Distribution System 
The Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility, WETF (TA-16), is a one-story; 5,000 square 
foot building that has been in operation since 1989. The primary functions of this facility 
are to repackage, recycle, analyze, and mix tritium gas products. 
 
WETF is supplied by two identical tanks located in the same area within TA-16 as shown 
in Figure 5. These tanks are used both for domestic and fire-protection supply for over 75 
buildings within TA-16 as well as buildings in other Technical Areas. Both tanks are made 
of welded steel and are unanchored. The tanks have a common source and discharge piping 
configuration. It is not known if the loss of one tank would drain the second tank and both 
independent and coupled tank cases are considered. The tanks connect to the pipe system 
using a rigid connection that is routed directly through the concrete foundation into the 
ground.  
 
The WETF pipe system consists of four types of pipe material: cast iron, steel, ductile iron, 
and copper as summarized in Table 3.  Up to 30 isolation valves may need to be closed to 
dedicate the water distribution system to WETF and remove leaking branch lines.   
 
 
Two identical tanks 
Capacity: 1 million gallons 
each 
Height: 48 ft 
Width: 60 ft 
Height-to-width ratio: 0.81 
 
Figure 5.  Water Tank TA-16-171 and TA-16-247. 
 
Table 3. WETF Water Distribution System Piping 
Material Diameter (in.) Length (ft)
Cast Iron < 12 8,399 
Steel < 12 2,980 
Ductile Iron < 12 476 
Copper < 12 70 
 11,925  
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3.2.3 RLWTF and WCRRF Water-Distribution System 
The Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility, RLWTF (TA-50-1) treats the 
radioactive liquid waste generated from other various facilities within the lab.  Solid 
waste is repackaged in the Waste Characterization, Reduction and Repackaging Facility, 
WCRRF (TA-50-69).  
 
The first upstream water tank supplying RLWTF and WCRRF is identified as TA-64-3, 
shown in Figure 6. Within TA-50 alone TA-64-3 tank supplies domestic water to over 30 
buildings not including RLWTF and WCRRF. This tank also supplies other buildings 
outside TA-50.  The tank is anchored to the foundation, as shown in Figure 2. The water 
distribution piping associated with the RLWTF and WCRRF is summarized in Table 4 
and has a total length of 12,458 feet. Up to 35 isolation valves may need to be closed to 
dedicate the water distribution system to RLWTF/WCRRF and remove leaking branch 
lines. 
 
 
Capacity: 500,000 gallons 
Height: 35 ft 
Width: 49 ft 
Height-to-width ratio: 0.71 
 
Figure 6.  Water tank TA-64-3. 
 
 
Table 4.  RLWTF and WCRRF Distribution System Piping 
Material Diameter (in.) Length (ft)
Cast Iron < 12 13,315 
Transite < 12 600 
Galvanized Steel < 12 110 
Ductile Iron < 12 1,635 
 15,660  
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3.2.4 TWISP Water-Distribution System 
The TWISP (TA-54-Area G) facility retrieves, identifies, and stores drums and reinforced 
boxes containing waste.   
 
TWISP is supplied water by a tank TA-54-1006 shown in Figure 7. This tank has a direct 
line to Pajarito Wells No. 2, 4, and 5. This tank is made of welded steel and is 
unanchored. In normal operations, the tank provides domestic water to more than 30 
other buildings within TA-54 and to buildings in other areas. A common source and 
discharge design have been implemented for the tank. The pipe-to-tank connection is 
rigid and is routed directly through the bottom of the foundation pad.  
 
The pipe system is made up primarily of PVC as shown in Table 5. Additional materials 
involved with this system are CCP, ductile iron, copper, and galvanized steel. Up to 17 
isolation valves may need to be closed to dedicate the water distribution system to 
TWISP and remove leaking branch lines.  
 
 
Capacity: 1.5 million gallons 
Height: 35 ft 
Width: 85 ft 
Height-to-width ratio 0.41 
 
Figure 7.  Water tank TA-54-1006. 
 
 
Table 5.  TWISP Water Distribution System Piping 
Material Diameter (in.) Length (ft)
PVC 16 5,156 
CCP 18 131 
PVC <12 17,662 
Ductile Iron <12 1,103 
Galvanized Steel <12 341 
Copper <12 52 
 24,445  
10 
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4. Analysis Methodology 
The methodology used in this assessment follows the American Lifelines Alliance (ALA) 
seismic fragility formulations for water systems that considers the individual probability 
of failure because of 
 
• Pipe Break 
o Wave propagation 
o Permanent ground displacement  
o Fault displacement 
• Tank Failure 
o Base weld failure 
o Wall buckling 
o Inlet-outlet pipe damage 
o Permanent ground deformation 
 
System-level failure frequencies are convolved with the facility seismic hazard to 
determine the failure frequency. Failure frequencies are compared to the DOE-STD-1020 
performance goals.  
4.1 Component Fragilities 
4.1.1 Pipe Break 
The ALA probabilistic pipe break models consider pipe damage caused by three major 
contributors. The first contributor is wave propagation. Wave propagation damage is 
damage directly related to the ground shaking and includes the wave passage effects 
considered in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 4. The second 
contributing factor is permanent ground deformation. Permanent ground deformation 
damage is primarily attributed to liquefaction but can include differential settlement, 
landslides, etc. The third factor included in the model is fault offset. Fault offset damage 
imposes the fault displacements on short sections of pipe. 
4.1.1.1 Wave Propagation and Ground Deformation 
Both wave propagation and ground deformation damage are based on empirical pipe 
repair ratio (RR) vulnerability relationships that include factors to account for different 
materials, joints, soils, and diameters. The RRs for wave propagation and permanent 
ground deformation can be determined using the following formulas.  
Wave Propagation: 
RR = K1 × 0.00187 PGV (1) 
σlnK = 1.15 (2) 
Permanent Ground Deformation: 
RR = K2 × 1.06 PGDL0.319 (3) 
σlnK = 0.74 (4) 
where: RR = mean number of repairs per 1,000 feet of pipe, 
 σlnK  = logarithmic standard deviation, 
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 PGV = Peak Ground Velocity, inches/second, 
 PGDL = Permanent Ground Deformation, inches, 
 K1 and K2 are modifiers defined in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
Table 6.  Pipe Modification Factors for Wave Propagation 
Pipe Material  Joint Type  Soils  Diam.  K1  
Cast iron  Cement  All  ≤12″ 1.0  
Cast iron  Cement  Corrosive  ≤12″  1.4  
Cast iron  Cement  Noncorrosive  ≤12″ 0.7  
Cast iron  Rubber gasket  All  ≤12″ 0.8  
Welded steel  Lap⎯Arc welded All  ≤12″ 0.6  
Welded steel  Lap⎯Arc welded Corrosive  ≤12″ 0.9  
Welded steel  Lap⎯Arc welded Noncorrosive  ≤12″ 0.3  
Welded steel  Lap⎯Arc welded All  ≥16″ 0.15  
Welded steel  Rubber gasket  All  ≤12″ 0.7  
Welded steel  Screwed  All  ≤12″ 1.3  
Welded steel  Riveted  All  ≤12″ 1.3  
Asbestos cement  Rubber gasket  All  ≤12″ 0.5  
Asbestos cement  Cement  All  ≤12″ 1.0  
Concrete w/Stl Cyl.*  Lap⎯Arc Welded  All  ≥16″ 0.7  
Concrete w/Stl Cyl.  Cement  All  ≥16″ 1.0  
Concrete w/Stl Cyl.  Rubber Gasket  All  ≥16″ 0.8  
PVC  Rubber gasket  All  ≤12″ 0.5  
Ductile iron  Rubber gasket  All  ≤12″ 0.5  
*Steel cylinder 
 
Table 7.  Pipe Modification Factors for Permanent Ground Displacement 
Pipe Material  Joint Type  K2  
Cast iron  Cement  1.0  
Cast iron  Rubber gasket  0.8  
Cast iron  Mechanical restraint  0.7  
Welded steel  Arc welded, lap welds (large 
diameter, noncorrosive) 0.15  
Welded steel  Rubber gasket  0.7  
Asbestos cement  Rubber gasket  0.8  
Asbestos cement  Cement  1.0  
Concrete w/Stl Cyl.  Welded  0.6  
Concrete w/Stl Cyl.  Cement  1.0  
Concrete w/Stl Cyl.  Rubber gasket  0.7  
PVC  Rubber gasket  0.8  
Ductile iron  Rubber gasket  0.5  
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The RR is based on utility repair records following the 1995 Kobe, 1994 Northridge, 
1989 Loma Prieta, and 1971 San Fernando earthquakes. It is important to note that the 
utility crews were focused on returning the water system to service and that some records 
are incomplete. Thus, there were repairs made that are not reflected in the empirical 
database. On the conservative side, damage ranged from completely severed lines to 
functional lines that leaked. Additionally, some repairs were repeated and recorded 
multiple times, at locations where the ground continued to creep following the 
earthquake. It is our judgment that these effects are offsetting and that the RR represents 
the best estimate of pipe failure.  
 
ALA uses a Poisson probability distribution to calculate the probability of an individual 
pipe link, remaining in service with zero repairs (not breaking) as 
 
L
ServiceInPipe eP
λ−= , (5) 
where, λ = the larger of wave propagation or permanent ground deformation RR, and 
 L = length of pipe, in 1,000 feet. 
 
The probability of failure for an entire run of pipes is 
 
iServiceInPipeServiceofOutPipelinef
P1PP ∏−==  (6) 
 
4.1.1.2 Fault Offset 
The ALA probability of failure because of fault crossing is represented by the following 
relationships, which are shown in Figure 8. 
Continuous pipeline (e.g., welded steel) 95.0
60
70.0 ≤×= ff
PGD
P  
PGDf = 0″ Pf = 0 
1″ ≤PGDf ≤12″ Pf = 0.50  
13″ ≤PGDf ≤24″ Pf = 0.80  
Segmented pipeline  
(e.g., cast iron with cemented joints) 
24″ ≤ PGDf Pf = 0.95  
Where: PGDf is the permanent ground deformation of the fault. 
 
4.1.2 Tank Failure 
The ALA probabilistic tank failure model considers the following tank failure modes that 
are applicable to LANL water tanks:  
(1) Base Weld Failure: Most LANL tanks have a circular bottom plate and cylindrical 
walls. The weld at the wall-bottom junction must resist bending caused by 
internal pressure in addition to uplift and shear forces from seismic loads. 
Overstressing this weld results in a rupture that can release the tank’s contents. 
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Figure 8.  Probability of pipe failure caused by a fault offset. 
 
 (2) Inlet-Outlet Pipe Fracture: Fracture of piping rigidly connected to the tank is a 
common mode of failure that is typically caused by vertical tank displacements 
caused by uplift, buckling, or foundation failure. Pipe fracture can also be caused 
by tank sliding. The piping connections to LANL tanks that were considered in 
the scope of this evaluation are rigid with little flexibility to accommodate seismic 
deformations. 
(3) Buckling: During a seismic event, portions of the tank wall are susceptible to 
buckling. The “elephant foot” buckling mode is common for water tanks and is 
considered in this assessment. During elephant foot buckling, portions of the tank 
wall experience very high strains and may rupture, releasing the tank’s contents. 
Small amounts of buckling, which do not rupture the tank wall, are omitted from 
this assessment. Inlet-outlet pipes are called nozzles in this assessment to avoid 
confusion with water-distribution piping. 
(4) Permanent Ground Deformation: Damage resulting from PGD is most commonly 
attributed to liquefaction; however, other causes associated with seismic events 
are also likely, including, but not limited to, landslides and differential settlement. 
 
Because this assessment is focused on the water supply for fire suppression, damage 
states that do not challenge functionality have been omitted. 
 
The ALA representative fragility curves are used to assess the tank failure frequency that 
is summarized in Table 8. These curves are based on average results of analytical 
calculations for various classes of water tanks supplemented by engineering judgment. 
The ALA document warns that these curves should only be considered representative of 
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fragilities for specific tanks and should always be adjusted for tank-specific conditions. In 
consideration of this caution, the ALA representative fragility curves are interpreted to 
represent the average behavior of the six tank populations considered in this assessment. 
 
 
Table 8.  ALA Representative Tank Fragility Curves 
Class Damage State Parameter Median Beta 
Unanchored Steel Tank 100,000 to 2,000,000 gallons (CMR, TWISP, WETF x 2) 
 Weld failure at base⎯loss of contents Sa @ 8 hz 3.0 g 0.50 
 Nozzle Failure⎯loss of contents Sa @ 8 hz 1.8 g 0.50 
 Elephant foot buckle⎯loss of contents Sa @ 8 hz 1.0 g 0.50 
 Ground failure PGD 36 in. 0.50 
Anchored Steel Tank 100,000 to 2,000,000 gallons (RLWTF & WCRRF) 
 Weld failure at base⎯loss of contents Sa @ 7 hz 5.7 g 0.50 
 Nozzle Failure⎯loss of contents Sa @ 7 hz 4.0 g 0.50 
 Elephant foot buckle⎯loss of contents Sa @ 7 hz 5.5 g 0.50 
 Ground failure PGD 36 in. 0.50 
Unanchored Steel Tank >2,000,000 gallons (None in this assessment) 
 Weld failure at base⎯loss of contents Sa @ 5 hz 2.1 g 0.50 
 Nozzle Failure⎯loss of contents Sa @ 5 hz 1.4 g 0.50 
 Elephant foot buckle⎯loss of contents Sa @ 5 hz 0.75 g 0.50 
 Ground failure PGD 36 in. 0.50 
Anchored Steel Tank >2,000,000 gallons (None in this assessment) 
 Weld failure at base⎯loss of contents Sa @ 5 hz 3.6 g 0.50 
 Nozzle Failure⎯loss of contents Sa @ 5 hz 3.2 g 0.50 
 Ground failure PGD 36 in. 0.50 
 
4.1.3 Component Failure 
Components such as valves, fire hydrants, etc., are typically very robust to ensure 
operability. These components are assumed to be more rugged compared to the piping 
that they are connected to. As such, the fragility of these components is judged not to 
contribute to the system fragilities reported below. 
4.2 System Fragility and Probability of Failure 
System fragilities are developed using the process in Reference 11. For a given ground 
motion level, the probability of failure of each component is calculated from the 
component fragility curves. For the water distribution system, failure occurs if either the 
piping OR any of the tank components fail. Thus, the probability of system failure, given 
a specific ground motion level, is 
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( ){ }[ ]...P)P1(P)P1(P)P1(PP fDfCfCfBfBfAfASystemf +−+−+−+=   ,  (7) 
where, PfA, PfB, etc., are the probabilities of failure of the water-distribution piping, tank-
base weld, tank-piping connection, tank-wall bucking, etc., at the specific ground-motion 
level. 
 
The system fragility curve is constructed by plotting the system probability of failure for 
different magnitudes of a common ground motion parameter. The ground-motion 
parameter may be either PGA, PGV, spectral acceleration, etc.  
 
The annual probability of failure for a system is determined by a convolution of the 
seismic hazard and system fragility curves [10, 11]. 
∫
∞
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
0
a/F da
da
dP)a(HPf , (8) 
where dPF/a/da is the conditional probability density function that describes the 
probability of failure (PF), given an earthquake in the range da, and H(a) is the seismic 
hazard curve. 
4.3 Seismic Input 
4.3.1 Ground Motion 
Peak ground displacement, velocity, and acceleration are extracted from the current 
Probabilistic Seismic Hazards Analysis (PSHA) [7] time histories for 500 to 10,000 year 
return periods and summarized in Table 9.   
 
Table 9.  Seismic Hazard for Peak Ground Parameters 
Return Period 
Annual Exceedance
Probability 
PGA 
(g) 
PGV 
(ips) 
PGD 
(in.) 
100 1 × 10-2 0.04 1.14 0.73 
500 2 × 10-3 0.16 4.33 2.76 
1,000 1 × 10-3 0.22 7.87 3.62 
2,000 5 × 10-4 0.31 12.60 4.92 
10,000 1 × 10-4 0.60 32.28 11.81 
 
The PSHA developed seismic hazards at TA-2, -3, -16, -18, -21, -41, -46, and -55. This 
assessment includes systems, structures, and components (SSCs) in TA-3, -16, -50, and -
54. The seismic hazard at TA-55 is used for TA-50 because the two facilities are adjacent 
to each other. Sites TA-46 and TA-54 are close to each other and both are located on top 
of the same mesa. Thus, the seismic hazard at TA-54 is represented by the seismic hazard 
at TA-46. 
 
The peak ground acceleration at 100 years is measured from the TA-3, -16, -46, and -55 
hazard curves. At the 100-year return period, the peak ground velocity and displacement 
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are the 500-year velocity/acceleration (V/A) and displacement/acceleration (D/A) ratios 
times the 100-year peak ground acceleration. 
 
The PSHA provides surface motions that take LANL-specific site amplification into 
account. Thus, the International Building Code (IBC) [12] surface motion amplification 
factors need not be applied to the PSHA results. Interpolating the data in Table 10 for a 
2,500-year “Maximum Credible Earthquake” (MCE) specified by IBC yields the peak 
ground acceleration, velocity, and displacements in Table 11. The IBC design ground 
motion is based on two-thirds of the MCE that is also shown in the table.   
 
The LANL Engineering Standards Manual (ESM) [13] follows the IBC procedure for 
determining surface ground motions for LANL and specifies SDS = 0.54 g for PC-1 and 
PC-2 structures. Using the IBC spectral amplification factor of 2.5, SDS = 0.54 g 
corresponds to a 0.216 g PGA. Thus, the IBC design ground motion for PC-1 and PC-2 
SSC, is consistent with the LANL PSHA. 
 
 
 
Table 10.  IBC Ground Motion Parameters 
2,500 years  
Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE)
IBC Design Ground Motion 
2/3 MCE 
PGA = 0.35 g PGA = 0.23 g 
PGV = 15 ips* PGV = 10 ips 
PGD = 5.9 in. PGD = 3.9 in. 
* inches per second 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.  Mean Probabilistic Fault Displacements (in.) [8, 9] 
Return Period 500 1,000 2,000 10,000 
APE 2 × 10-3 1 × 10-3 5 × 10-4 1 × 10-4
 TA-3 TA-16 TA-3 TA-16 TA-3 TA-16 TA-3 TA-16 
Distributed Faulting 
  Case 1a  <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 ≈0.1 <0.1 
  Case 1b <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1
  Case 1c <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1
Principal Faulting 
 
  Case 2 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <<0.1 <0.1 0.67 21 
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Note that the peak ground parameters are not modified by the IBC importance factor, I 
for PC-2 SSC. IBC has one earthquake, which is two-thirds the maximum considered 
earthquake or two-thirds of an earthquake with a 2,500-year mean return period. The 
importance factor is included in the base shear term (R/I), which reflects that buildings 
with a high importance factor, such as fire stations and hospitals, have less damage and 
are available for immediate occupancy. The base shear term (R/I) is conservatively 
assumed to be unity in this assessment. 
4.3.2 Response Spectra 
The PSHA generates site-specific response spectra at each technical area. However, there 
is typically a small variation in spectral acceleration between TA-3, -16, -46, and -55, as 
shown in Figure 9. This variation is not significant for this assessment. The spectral 
accelerations at the four sites are averaged together to form a composite seismic hazard 
curve, shown in Figure 10, which is used for the different technical areas in this 
assessment. 
 
4.3.3 Permanent Ground Deformation 
The database used to develop permanent ground deformation is predominately based on 
liquefaction events. Liquefaction occurs in saturated soils. Because liquefaction only 
occurs in saturated soil, its effects are most commonly observed in low-lying areas near 
bodies of water such as rivers, lakes, bays, and oceans [14, 15]. The facilities considered 
in this assessment are located on mesa tops with a typical depth to the water table of over 
900 feet. Liquefaction events are very improbable for these soil conditions and are not 
considered further for PC-2 SSC.   
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Figure 9.  Seismic hazard curves for 0.2-second spectral accelerations at different TAs. 
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Figure 10.  Seismic hazard curve. 
 
 
Also included in the database are landslides and differential settlement. Landslides 
typically have large displacements (>>10 inches) over distances ranging from 100 to 
1,000+ feet. Reference 16 parametrically evaluated slope stability for the building in  
TA-3 near the edge of a mesa subject to PC-2 seismic loading and concluded that there are 
large factors of safety for the range of tuff properties expected across LANL. Presuming 
that the slope profiles are representative of slope profiles adjacent to water lines, then the 
factor of safety for slope stability (landslides) is adequate for PC-2 loadings. Thus, failure 
caused by peak ground displacement is not considered further for PC-2 SSC. 
4.3.4 Fault Offset 
Probabilistic fault displacements are summarized in Table 11 for TA-3 and TA-16, which 
are close to portions of the Rendija Canyon and Pajarito fault [8, 9]. Cases 1a, 1b, and 1c 
represent distributed faulting. Case 2 is a hypothetical case where a trace of the fault 
transects the site. The fault displacement hazard curve for TA-16, shown in Figure 11  
 
indicates that the probability of fault displacement is negligible for return periods less 
than about 3,500 years (annual probability exceedance [APE] = 2.8 × 10-4). Thus, failure 
caused by fault offset is not considered further for PC-2 SSC. 
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Figure 11.  TA-16 probabilistic fault displacement [9]. 
 
4.3.5 Ground Motion Parameter 
The peak ground velocity is chosen as the common ground motion parameter. The 0.2 
second spectral acceleration is converted to PGV by  
g
Saips13
g
Sa
2
sec/in4.386PGV
sec2.0
1
2
=π= , (9) 
where Sa is the 0.2 second spectral acceleration in g’s. The shape of the PGV and 0.2 
second Sa hazard curves are somewhat different as seen in Figure 12. Using the PGV to 
estimate the 0.2 second Sa hazard introduces conservatism for peak ground velocities 
greater than about 5 ips.   
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Figure 12.  Comparison of hazard curves. 
 
4.4 Performance Goal for PC-1 and PC-2 SSC 
DOE-STD-1020 defines target performance goals for PC-1, -2, -3, and -4 SSCs, shown in 
Table 12. For PC-2 SSC, DOE-STD-1020-94 used UBC-94 as the model building code 
with an importance factor of I = 1.25 for PC-2 SSC. DOE-1020-2002 uses the IBC-2000 
building code with an importance factor of 1.5 for PC-2 SSC. The IBC-2000 seismic 
requirements are more stringent than the UBC-94 seismic requirements, and the achieved 
performance of a PC-2 SSC designed to DOE-STD-1020-2002 is better than the target 
performance goal stated in Table 12. 
  
DOE-STD-1020 Section 2.4.2 “Evaluation of Existing Facilities” allows the doubling of 
the seismic hazard for the evaluation of existing SSC. 
 
 
Table 12.  DOE-STD-1020 Performance Goals 
Annual Probability of Exceeding Acceptable Behavior Limits, PF 
Target Performance Goal 
Performance Class New SSC Existing SSC 
PC-1 1 × 10-3 2 × 10-3
PC-2 5 × 10-4 1 × 10-3
PC-3 1 × 10-4 2 × 10-4
PC-4 1 × 10-5 2 × 10-5
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5. Component Failure Frequencies 
The failure frequency of individual components is calculated in this section for various 
levels of seismic input. 
5.1 Pipe Fragilities 
The probability of pipe failure is determined by using: 
1) Equation 1 to calculate the repair ratio, RR;  
2) Equation 5 to calculate the probability of each individual run of piping remaining 
in service, PPipe In Service; and  
3) Equation 6 to calculate the probability of failure, Pf = PPipe Out Of Service.   
 
The median seismic capacity of is expressed in terms of peak ground velocity, PGV50, 
which has a 50% probability of failure, Pf = 0.50 and is determined iteratively. PGV50 is 
summarized in Table 13.  
 
The repair ratio, probability of each individual run of piping remaining in service, and 
probability of failure for TWISP PGV50 is shown in Table 14. The long run (≈3.3 miles) 
of small-diameter PVC piping that supplies TWISP is the greatest contributor to risk, 
followed by the ≈1-mile-long run of large-diameter PVC piping.  
 
Table 13.  Summary of PGV50 (ips) 
 CMR RLWTF TWISP WCRRF WETF 
Median 28.28 44.48 24.44 133.05 42.05 
σlnk= 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
 
 
Table 14. TWISP RR, PPipe In Service, and Pf for PGV = 24.44 ips 
Material 
Diameter 
(inch) 
Length, 
L (ft) K1 
Repair 
Ratio, RR, 
per 1000 ft
Probability of Each 
Individual Section 
Remaining in Service, 
PPipe In Service
PVC >12" 5,156 1.0 0.0457 0.7900 
CCP >12" 131 1.0 0.0457 0.9940 
PVC <12" 17,662 0.5 0.0229 0.6679 
Galv. Steel <12" 341 1.3 0.0594 0.9799 
Copper <12" 52 1.0 0.0457 0.9976 
Ductile Iron <12" 1103 0.5 0.0229 0.9751 
=Π−= )(1 ServiceinPipef PP 0.50 
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Pipe failure fragility curves caused by wave propagation are shown in Figure 13. These 
curves are constructed by  
KlnePGVPGV 50
σ×β= , (10) 
where  σlnK is the lognormal standard deviation, Equation 2, and 
 β is the number of standard deviations from the median. 
 
The conditional probability of pipe failure caused by wave propagation is extracted from 
Figure 13 for a peak ground velocity of 10 ips that corresponds to the PC-2 design ground 
motion and is summarized in Table 15. The probability of pipe failure is between 11% for 
WETF and 22% for TWISP. CMR has a 0.06-g DBE that corresponds to a peak ground 
velocity of 0.06 × (1.14/0.04) = 1.71 ips, where (1.14/0.04) is the ratio PGV/PGA from 
Table 10 for a 100-year earthquake. From Figure 13, the conditional probability of piping 
failure for CMR at 0.06g DBE is 1%. 
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Figure 13.  Pipe failure fragility curves due to wave propagation.  
 
Table 15.  Conditional Probability of Water Distribution Piping Failure 
For Acceptance Criteria Earthquake 
Facility Acceptance Criteria PGV (ips) DBEfP  
CMR 0.06-g DBE 1.7 1% 
WETF PC-2 10 11% 
RLWTF & WCRRF PC-2 10 17% 
TWISP PC-2 10 22% 
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The results in Table 16 are based on the assumption that all the existing valves needed to 
dedicate the water distribution system to a specific facility and remove leaking branch 
lines are closed. At this time, there is no protocol in emergency response that requires 
such action.  
 
The water distribution system for a representative technical area, TA-16, which includes 
the WETF facility, is shown in Figure 14. There are 11,925 feet of piping with the 
isolation valves closed and 93,127 feet of piping with the isolation valves open. The 
conditional probability of pipe failure for the PC-2 event is 11% when the isolation 
valves are closed and 73% when the isolation valves are open. Thus, increasing the length 
of piping by a factor of 8 increased the conditional probability of pipe failure by nearly 
the same amount. 
 
Table 16.  Conditional Probability of Tank Failure 
for the Acceptance Criteria Earthquake 
Facility Acceptance Criteria Sa (g) DBEfP  
CMR 0.06 g DBE 0.13 <<1% 
WETF PC-2 0.54 12% Independent 22% Coupled 
RLWTF & WCRRF PC-2 0.54 <<1% 
TWISP PC-2 0.54 12% 
 
 
Water Distribution System with CLOSED 
Isolation Valves, 
11,925 feet of piping 
Pf = 11% for PC-2 PGV 
Water Distribution System with OPEN 
Isolation Valves, 
 93,127 feet of piping 
Pf = 73% for PC-2 PGV 
Figure 14.  TA-16 water distribution system. 
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The results of this assessment are very sensitive to the assumption that isolation valves 
are closed, limiting the length of the piping in the water supply system to the critical 
facility.  Additionally, the probabilities of failure in Table 16 can be reduced by installing 
isolation valves to remove unnecessary branch lines from the tank to the facility water 
distribution system. 
 
As discussed previously, the hazard resulting from permanent ground deformation and 
fault offset are not significant for PC-2 SSC. Thus, the probability of pipe failure caused 
by permanent ground deformation and fault offset are not considered. 
5.2 Tank Failure 
The tank fragility curves in Table 9 are plotted versus peak spectral acceleration in 
Figures 15 and 16. As seen in Figure 15, failure of an unanchored tank is dominated by 
buckling that leads to a loss of contents. The combined probability of failure is calculated 
using Equation 7. 
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Figure 15.  Fragility for unanchored steel tank 100,000 to 2,000,000 gallons 
(CMR, TWISP, WETF x 2). 
25 
Seismic Fragility of the LANL Fire Water Distribution System  LA-14325  
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Spectral Acceleration (g)
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f F
ai
lu
re
Combined
Nozzle Damage
Buckling
Base weld Failure
 
Figure 16.  Fragility curve for anchored steel tank 100,000 to 2,000,000 gallons (RLWTF and 
WCRRF). 
 
The 0.2-second spectral acceleration in Figure 10 is taken as the peak spectral 
acceleration for the 7- and 8-hz tank failure modes. This is consistent with the broad IBC 
spectral shape. Consistent with the IBC, two-thirds of the MCE 2,500-year ground 
motion is 2/3(0.81) = 0.54 g; which matches the SDS specified by the LANL ESM. The 
spectral acceleration for the 0.06 g CMR DBE is determined from Figure 10 and has the 
same exceedance probability as the 0.06 g DBE. 
 
The probability of tank failure is extracted from Figures 14 and 15 and summarized in 
Table 16 for various tanks. Two unanchored tanks feed WETF. Because both tanks feed 
the same distribution system, then they may be coupled, and the failure of one tank could 
result in the loss of both tanks contents. The probability of failure for the coupled tanks 
was calculated with Equation 7 using 2×3 failure mechanisms (i.e. buckling–tank A, 
buckling–tank B, etc.).  
 
6. System Failure Frequencies 
Individual component failure frequencies are combined to establish system fragilities. 
System fragilities are then convolved with the seismic hazard to obtain the probability of 
failure. 
6.1 Conditional Probability of Failure 
The conditional probabilities of failure contained in this assessment are based upon the 
earthquakes in Table 1. The conditional probabilities of failure are summarized in 
Table 17 below. Conditional failure probabilities for piping and tank components are 
combined with Equation 7. 
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Table 17.  Summary of Conditional Probabilities of Failure 
 for the Acceptance Criteria Earthquake 
 Acceptance Conditional Probability of Failure, DBEfP  
Facility Criteria Piping Tank Combined 
CMR 0.06 g DBE 1% <<1% 1% 
WETF PC-2 11% 12% Independent 22% Coupled 
22% Independent 
31% Combined 
RLWTF & WCRRF PC-2 10% <<1% 18% 
TWISP PC-2 22% 12% 31% 
 
6.2 System Fragility Curves 
The components in each system are identified in Table 18. The four WETF cases are to 
investigate the effects of coupled versus independent tanks and to investigate the effects 
of closing isolation valves. 
 
 
Table 18.  Components for Each System Analyzed 
 System 
WETF Case 
 CMR 
RLWTF & 
WCRRF TWSIP # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 
Isolation Valves Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Open 
Components        
        
Water Distribution Piping 
CMR 1       
RLWTF  1      
TWSIP   1     
WCRRF        
WETF    1 1   
WETF w/Open Isolation Valves   1 1 
Unanchored Tanks 
Base Weld Failure 1  1 2 Coup. 2 Ind. 2 Coup. 2 Ind. 
Nozzle  Damage 1  1 2 Coup. 2 Ind. 2 Coup. 2 Ind. 
Buckling 1  1 2 Coup. 2 Ind. 2 Coup. 2 Ind. 
Anchored Tanks 
Base Weld Failure  1      
Nozzle Damage  1      
Buckling  1      
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The component fragility curves in Figures 15 and 16 are converted to the PGV ground 
motion parameter by applying Equation 9 to the abscissa. For each value of the ground 
motion parameter, the individual component failure probabilities are combined using 
Equation 7, resulting in the system fragility curves shown in Figure 17.   
 
As expected, the WETF cases with open isolation valves have the highest probability of 
failure at a given level of ground motion. RLWTF has the lowest probability of failure for 
a given level of ground motion because it has an anchored tank that has a negligible 
contribution to the seismic hazard. The RLWTF system curve is almost identical to the 
pipe failure fragility curve in Figure 13. The remaining systems are ordered in terms of 
decreasing length of distribution piping. 
 
6.3 Annual Probability of Failure 
The annual probability of failure of the water-distribution systems, shown in Table 19, is 
determined by the convolution of the seismic-hazard and system-fragility curves using 
Equation 8, with the variables:   
 PF/a is the system fragility curve shown in Figure 17, 
 dPF/a/da is the conditional probability density function that describes the 
probability of failure (PF), given an earthquake in the range da; dPF/a/da is 
determined numerically from the data in Figure 17, and 
 H(a) is a piecewise log-log seismic hazard curve labeled “Hazard Due to PGV” in 
Figure 12. 
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Figure 17.  System fragility curves. 
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Table 19.  Summary of Water Distribution System Annual Failure Probabilities 
System 
Isolation
Valve Water Tank 
Annual Failure 
Probability 
Return
Period 
CMR  Closed 1 Unanchored 9.2 × 10-4 1,100 
RLWTF and WCRRF  Closed 1 Anchored 4.8 × 10-4 2,100 
TWSIP  Closed 1 Unanchored 10. × 10-4 1,000 
WETF-1 Closed 2 Unanchored, Coupled 9.7 × 10-4 1,000 
WETF-2 Closed 2 Unanchored, Indep. 7.8 × 10-4 1,300 
WETF-3 Open 2 Unanchored, Coupled 43. × 10-4 230 
WETF-4 Open 2 Unanchored, Indep. 42. × 10-4 240 
 
The integration in Equation 8 is carried out numerically from a minimum value of 0.01 to 
twice the maximum PGV. The hazard data, H(a), are extrapolated between 0.01 and the 
minimum value. Limits of integration smaller than 0.01 or larger than 2Max[PGV] do not 
affect the value of Pf. 
 
6.4 Reconciliation of Conditional Failure Probability and Annual Failure Probability 
The TWISP water distribution piping has a 22% chance of failure for the IBC ground 
motion (Table 16). The IBC ground motion has a return period of about 1,400 years and 
is the PC-2 design-basis earthquake. The basic safety objective of DOE-STD-1020 is to 
have no more than a 10% probability of failure at 1.5 times the design-basis ground 
motion. The TWISP water distribution piping clearly does not meet this criterion.  
 
However, the DOE-STD-1020 basic safety objective was developed [10] for SSC with 
lognormal standard deviations between 0.3 and 0.6, but ALA specifies a lognormal 
standard deviation for water distribution systems of 1.15. Thus, the water distribution 
system in this assessment is outside the bounds used to develop the basic safety objective. 
 
A plot of the TWISP water distribution piping Probability Density Function (PDF) is 
shown in Figure 18. The PDF is lognormally distributed with a median value of 24.44 ips 
and a logarithmic standard deviation of 1.15. Also shown are distributions with 
logarithmic standard deviations of 0.3 and 0.6. Note that the distribution with σlnk = 1.15 
is much more sensitive to small values of PGV than the other two distributions. Thus, the 
large logarithmic standard deviation makes the water distribution piping probability of 
failure more sensitive to small PGV than considered in the development of DOE-
STD-1020. 
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Figure 18.  TWISP water distribution system probability density function. 
 
The criteria in DOE-STD-1020 are also based on seismic hazard curves with a slope 
parameter, KH, between 1.5 and 4.0. The slope parameter for the LANL hazard curve for 
small PGV, which dominates the probability of failure calculation, is  
KH = 7.87/1.14 = 6.9. The difference in these two curves is shown graphically in  
Figure 19. From Figure 19 it can be seen that the KH = 4 hazard curve has a higher 
exceedance probability, which will increase the annual probability of failure for SSC that 
are sensitive to PGV less than about 8 ips. The TWISP water distribution piping has an 
annual component probability of failure of 5.6 × 10-4 (1,700-year return period) using the 
LANL hazard curve. Using the KH = 4 hazard curve in Figure 17, the annual probability 
of failure increases to 1.3 × 10-3 (720-year return period). 
 
At first glance, the TWISP water distribution piping annual probability of failure of  
5.6 × 10-4 does not appear to be consistent with a 22% chance of failure given the IBC 
ground motion. However, it has been shown that 
1. The low probability of failure is due to the unusual slope of the LANL hazard 
curve for small PGV.   
2. The large logarithmic standard deviation skewed the capacity PDF and increased 
the contribution of small PGV to the annual probability of failure. 
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Figure 19.  Comparison of LANL hazard and KH = 4 hazard. 
 
6.5 Potential Impact of the DRAFT 2007 Probabilistic Seismic Hazards Analysis 
The preceding results are based on the 1995 PSHA. As of January 2007, the 1995 PSHA 
is the analysis of record that defines the level of seismic input at LANL. 
 
An update to the 1995 PSHA is being prepared, and it is anticipated that this update will 
be implemented in 2007. Therefore, this update will be referred to as the DRAFT 2007 
PSHA. 
 
Preliminary and unverified results from the DRAFT 2007 PSHA suggest that the peak 
ground velocity may increase by a factor of 1.9 for a 2,500-year event. This increase 
reflects (1) a general increase in the level of ground acceleration; and (2) a significant 
increase in the low-frequency content of the ground motion. Peak ground velocities are 
currently not available for other return periods. 
 
An estimate of the potential impact of the DRAFT 2007 PSHA on the water system 
failure frequency is obtained by uniformly increasing the peak ground velocity in 
Figure 12 by a factor of 1.9 and recalculating the system failure frequencies in the 
preceding section. The resulting annual failure frequency is roughly twice the values 
shown in Table 20. 
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Table 20. Summary of Water Distribution System Annual Failure Probabilities 
System 
Isolation 
Valve 
Water 
Supply 
Tank 
Annual Failure
Probability, PF
Target Performance 
Goal for Existing SSC 
Meets 
Goal 
CMR  Closed 1 Unanchored 0.92 × 10
-3 0.06 g PGA Yes 
RLWTF  Closed 1 Anchored 0.48 × 10-3 PC-2, PF ≤ 1×10-3 Yes 
TWISP  Closed 1 Unanchored 1.00 × 10
-3 PC-2, PF ≤ 1×10-3 Yes 
WCRRF  Closed 1 Unanchored 0.48 × 10
-3 PC-2, PF ≤ 1×10-3 Yes 
WETF-1 Closed 
2 
Unanchored, 
Coupled 
0.97 × 10-3 PC-2, PF ≤ 1×10-3 Yes 
WETF-2 Closed 
2 
Unanchored, 
Independent 
0.78 × 10-3 PC-2, PF ≤ 1×10-3 Yes 
WETF-3 Open 
2 
Unanchored, 
Coupled 
4.3 × 10-3 PC-2, PF ≤ 1×10-3 No 
WETF-4 Open 
2 
Unanchored, 
Independent 
4.2 × 10-3 PC-2, PF ≤ 1×10-3 No 
 
DRAFT 2007 PSHA spectral acceleration hazard curves suggest that the probability of 
exceedance for small events has decreased while the probability of exceedance for large 
events has increased. Because spectral acceleration and peak ground velocity are related, 
then the peak ground velocity hazard curve should have a similar behavior. Thus, 
uniformly increasing the peak ground velocity in Figure 12 introduces conservatism into 
the failure frequency estimate.   
 
Therefore, the DRAFT 2007 PSHA is estimated to increase the probability of water 
distribution system failure by a factor of 2 or less. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
In a gap analysis of DOE-G-420.1-2, the Safety Basis Office determined five facilities 
that have fire suppression systems providing a safety function during natural phenomena 
events. The purpose of this assessment was to determine how these systems would 
perform with respect to seismic hazards.  
 
The methodology used in this assessment was developed by the ALA, a cooperative 
organization founded by FEMA and the ASCE. The methodology is based on observed 
water-distribution failures following earthquakes. The observed failures were culled from 
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utility repair records. It is important to note that the utility crews were focused on 
returning the water system to service and that some records are incomplete. Thus, there 
were repairs made that are not reflected in the empirical data base. On the conservative 
side, damage ranged from completely severed lines to functional lines that leaked. 
Additionally, some repairs were repeated and recorded multiple times, at locations where 
the ground continued to creep following the earthquake. It is our judgment that these 
effects are offsetting and that the ALA methodology represents the best estimate of pipe 
failure currently available.   
 
Some observed failure components, such as liquefaction and fault displacement, are not 
significant at LANL for PC-2 ground motions and were omitted from this assessment. 
 
Individual component fragilities are combined to obtain system fragilities that are 
convolved with the facility seismic hazard to determine the failure frequency. Failure 
frequencies for various systems are summarized and compared to the DOE-STD-1020 
performance goals in Table 20.  
 
The annual probability of failure is compared to the PC-2 performance goal in  
Appendix B of DOE-STD-1020. The performance goal has been reduced by a factor of 
two according to the existing facility evaluation criteria in DOE-STD-1020. All of the 
systems meet the target performance goal if their isolation valves are closed to dedicate 
the water distribution system to that facility and remove leaking branch lines.  
 
The acceptance criterion for CMR is to survive an earthquake with a 0.06 g peak ground 
acceleration. The criterion for CMR is relaxed from PC-2, based on the condition of the 
facility and safety-basis commitments. The CMR water distribution system also meets the 
PC-2 target performance goal if existing isolation valves are closed to dedicate the water 
distribution system to that facility and remove leaking branch lines. 
 
These results are highly dependent on the length of piping in the distribution system that 
can break. The results for CMR, RLWTF, TWISP, and WCRRF assume that existing 
isolation valves will be closed and that all piping that is not essential for supplying the 
nuclear facility from the distribution system will be removed.  
• Up to 48 (CMR) isolation valves per facility may need to be closed to dedicate the 
water-distribution system to a specific facility and remove leaking branch lines. 
• At this time, there is no protocol in emergency response that requires closing 
isolation valves. 
• Closing the isolation valves will negate fire fighting capability at nonnuclear 
facilities. 
• The potential for and consequences of closing the wrong isolation valve were not 
considered in this assessment. 
 
The probabilities of failure for WETF were calculated for cases of both open and closed 
isolation valves. Leaving the isolation valves open at WETF increases the probability of 
failure by roughly a factor of five. Similar increases for CMR, RLWTF, TWISP and 
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WCRRF are likely. A five-fold increase in failure probability would result in these 
facilities not meeting the PC-2 target performance goals. 
 
WETF is supplied by two water tanks, and the failure of one tank may result in the loss of 
the other tanks’ contents. Thus, the WETF results consider cases with two independent 
tanks and two coupled tanks. The coupled vs. independent tank issue is insignificant 
compared to the position of the isolation valves. 
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